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Abstract  
	  
Intrusion detection systems (IDSs) such as Snort apply deep packet 
inspection to detect intrusions. Usually, these are rule-based systems, where each 
incoming packet is matched with a set of rules. Each rule consists of two parts: the 
rule header and the rule options. The rule header is compared with the packet header. 
The rule options usually contain a signature string that is matched with packet 
content using an efficient string matching algorithm. The traditional approach to IDS 
packet inspection checks a packet against the detection rules by scanning from the 
first rule in the set and continuing to scan all the rules until a match is found. This 
approach becomes inefficient if the number of rules is too large and if the majority 
of the packets match with rules located at the end of the rule set. In this thesis, we 
propose an intelligent predictive technique for packet inspection based on data 
mining. We consider each rule in a rule set as a ‘class’. A classifier is first trained 
with labeled training data. Each such labeled data point contains packet header 
information, packet content summary information, and the corresponding class label 
(i.e. the rule number with which the packet matches). Then the classifier is used to 
classify new incoming packets. The predicted class, i.e. rule, is checked against the 
packet to see if this packet really matches the predicted rule. If it does, the 
corresponding action (i.e. alert) of the rule is taken. Otherwise, if the prediction of 
the classifier is wrong, we go back to the traditional way of matching rules. The 
advantage of this intelligent predictive packet matching is that it offers much faster 
rule matching. We have proved, both analytically and empirically, that even with 
millions of real network traffic packets and hundreds of rules, the classifier can 
achieve very high accuracy, thereby making the IDS several times faster in making 
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 )cibarA ni( tcartsbA dna eltiT
  
 لتصنیيفتنبؤ نوعع االاتصالل االشبكي عبر ااتحسیين أأددااء نظامم االتحقق وواالفحص االشبكي بوااسطة 
 االذكي
 االملخص
االدوورر االذيي تلعبھه أأنظمة االدفاعع االرقمي عبر االشبكاتت االھهدفف ھھھهذهه اااالأططرووحة ھھھهو ددررااسة 
االخبیيثة ووكشفھها ططرقق االتحقق من ھھھهویية االاتصالل االشبكي ووكیيفیية تحدیيد االحزمم  ،٬االإلكتروونیية
 ووفحص سرعة االاستجابة ووتطویيرھھھها من خلالل تحسیين االیية االبحث االمستخدمة حالیيا.
بیياناتت االمرسلة تعد من أأھھھهم ططرقق تتبع االھهجماتت اانن أأھھھهمیية أأنظمة االتحقق ووفحص اال
تزاایيد حجم االبیياناتت االمرسلة قد لا یيتمكن االنظامم من فحص  االالكتروونیية وواالتصديي لھها وولكن مع
االى ااحتمالیية عبورر بعض االھهجماتت االإلكتروونیية االى ووجھهتھها. جمیيع االبیياناتت االمرسلة مما یيؤدديي 
تصنیيف أأددااء االفحص لنظامم االتحقق من االحزمم االشبكیية بوااسطة  قدررةة تطویيرتتناوولل االدررااسة 
 االشبكي. كیية وواالتنبؤ بنوعع االاتصاللاالاتصالاتت االشب
تحتويي ھھھهذهه االرسالة على بعض خوااررززمیياتت االتنبؤ وواالتي تم ااستخداامھها لتصنیيف 
االاتصالاتت االشبكیية ووتحدیيد االاتصالل االشبكي االخبیيث مع تحدیيد ررددةة االفعل االمتوقعة من نظامم 
 االفحص.
 
 –االجداارر االنارريي  –فحص االشبكة  –اامن االمعلوماتت  –اامن االشبكاتت  :مفاھھھهیيم االبحث االرئیيسیية
 االجداارر االناررييااددااء 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview  
Security systems that monitor network packets, such as firewalls and IDSs, 
should be able to hold, analyze and log a network packet, as well as apply the 
required rules rapidly. Advanced attacks take advantage of a firewall’s or IDS’s 
performance issues; therefore, security researchers focus on both high performance 
and efficiency.  
Data mining is used to enhance the performance of several applications, and 
predicts the correct decision based on a training data set. Therefore, data mining 
improves both security and performance by predicting the right rule, instead of 
checking every possible rule. 
1.2 Problem Statement  
The large number of attack signatures makes IDS match and compares a lot 
of rules with incoming and outgoing packets. This mechanism of rule–packet 
comparison is accurate, but it may not work properly with a large number of packets 
and a large number of rules, as each rule is checked one by one. For example, if we 
received a malicious packet and this packet matched the last rule, then the IDS would 
take a long time to produce this matched rule.  
This would negatively affect an IDS’s performance, and may result in errors, 
allowing some packets to pass into the network without analysis and detection. 
Therefore, an IDS should find the right rule as fast as possible, without any 
performance issues. 
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1.3 Motivation and Contribution 
IDS rules have increased, and many other devices instead of just a laptop or 
PC can now be used to send malicious packets or attack others. The integration of 
physical and network penetration activities extends the scope of attacks, rules and 
network traffic. 
The options of now running attack tools with smartphones or installing an 
operating system such as Kali (which provides built-in common penetration test 
tools) are available for everyone. IDSs and other defense systems should provide 
high performance to secure networks and the Internet of things and smart cities’ 
systems. We use data mining to enhance the IDS’s performance by classifying 
malicious packets with corresponding rules, and sending those rule to IDS for 
verification against the received rule.  
1.4 Relevant Literature 
IDSs apply a packet matching technique that is similar to the packet filtering 
technique used by firewalls. In addition, IDSs apply signature matching to connect 
signatures with packet content. We will first discuss some relevant work in packet 
filtering enhancement, before moving on to discuss deep packet inspection by IDSs. 
Most of the existing research on the performance of firewalls focuses on the 
improvement of packet searching times by using various mechanisms, including 
hardware-based solutions (Baboescu, 2001), specialized data structures (Goyal, 
2015) (Woo, 2000), and heuristics (Gupta, 2001). Research works in (Hamed, 2006) 
(Kencl, 2006) focus on statistical filtering schemes to improve the average packet 
processing time. The structure of searching by taking into account packet flow 
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dynamics has been introduced by (Kencl, 2006), (Acharya, 2007). The segment-
based tree search (STS) scheme (El-Atawy, 2007) uses bounded depth Huffman trees 
to enhance the search based on statistics collected from segments. The idea of 
firewall optimization through early packet rejection was introduced by (Mothersole, 
2011), (Trabelsi, 2011) – (El-Atawy, 2009). In (Trabelsi, 2011), early packet 
rejection is done through rule-fields ordering. In (Trabelsi, 2012), early packet 
rejection is done through a multilevel filtering process that includes field and 
intersection filtering modules. In (Mothersole, 2011), an approach named FVSC is 
proposed to optimize the rejection path. This technique uses a set cover 
approximation algorithm to construct early rejection rules from original security 
policy common field values. The PBER technique introduced by (El-Atawy, 2009) is 
considered a generalization of FVSC (Mothersole, 2011), in the sense that FVSC 
only focuses on a rejection path while PBER finds shortcuts for both accepted and 
rejected packets. There has been some work on rule-filtering optimization using data 
mining. For example, (Cohen, 2005) applies a decision tree classifier for packet 
classification. In this case, the class label is either ‘accept’ or ‘deny’. However, our 
approach in this study addresses the problem differently: here, each class label is a 
rule rather than an ‘accept’ or ‘deny’. In our previous work (Mustafa, 2013), we 
applied a data mining technique to enhance packet filtering. However, this current 
work is more challenging, as the previous study only dealt with the packet header, 
which consists of a small number of features. On the other hand, this current, 
proposed work deals not only with the packet header, but also with packet content. 
Therefore, the number of features is very large (e.g. consider each byte of content as 
a feature) and the learning is more complex. However, we have applied a heuristic to 
reduce the feature set and improve learning performance and accuracy.  
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Chapter 2: Background – IDS and Data Mining 
2.1 Information Security  
Information security provides a set of policies and systems that protect 
information from unauthorized people. 
Protection means that unauthorized people are unable to access or modify 
data, even by accident. Protection mechanisms, systems and algorithms are created to 
preserve information confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
Confidentiality refers to the protection of data from unauthorized access, and 
the provision of access to authenticated users only. An example of a protection 
mechanism is access control implantation, which is one of the security mechanisms 
used to achieve confidentiality. 
 Examples of confidentiality attacks: 
-­‐   Session hijacking and the theft of user credentials. 
Integrity refers to the protection of data from unauthorized modification. 
Integrity is different from confidentiality. For example, providing access to students 
so they may see their grades does not mean that they can change their marks. 
Cryptography techniques such as hashing algorithms and digital signatures are 
examples of mechanisms used to achieve the integrity goal. 
Examples of Integrity attacks: 
-­‐   Data modifications through a man-in-the-middle (MITM) 
attack. 
-­‐   Data modification through SQL injection and cross-site 
scripting. 
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-­‐   Data modification using the exploitation phase (e.g. leveraging 
the application server privileges with its default credentials).  
In terms of availability, the required system, application, software, database, 
hardware and other assets should be available when requested; however, it does not 
mean that the user can request these assets 24/7. User–service interaction should be 
regulated by policy rules.  
Availability is a very critical issue, as it does not make sense to preserve both 
confidentiality and integrity for data that is not available to anyone! One single 
interruption may cost the organization a lot of money. Load balancers, backup 
systems, the offline mode, and the installation of a UPS battery in the data server 
room are examples of availability systems. 
Examples of availability attacks:  
-­‐   Physical destruction that makes the servers shut down, or 
causes the disconnection of the database or any other network component. 
-­‐   Distributed denial of service (DDOS).  
2.2 Detection and Prevention Systems  
Network attacks have become the weapons used by criminal organizations 
and malicious groups. People participate in social networks, transfer their credit card 
data, pictures and videos, and share their personal locations and other sensitive 
documents with each other online; this motives a lot of criminals and malicious 
groups to hack into the Internet. 
Security breaches may cause a lot of damage to victims. Intruders are 
everywhere, threatening and penetrating organizations; network administrators set 
several defense processes and systems to prevent intrusion attempts. However, 
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prevention is only a single line of defense in the face of these malicious attempts. 
Detection is also required to improve an organization’s security. 
Detection catches what prevention misses. For example, it is possible to 
detect firewall bypass attempts, access control bypasses (privilege escalation), or 
simply trace someone’s activities. Various network security mechanisms can counter 
attacks, and these mechanisms include firewalls, IDSs, IPSs and honeypots. Each of 
these mechanisms provides a different service to counter a threat and mitigate the 
risks. For example, the role of a firewall is the prevention of malicious traffic, 
whether that be software, hardware or both. It contains predefined rules for malicious 
attempts and allows users to create their own security rules, grouping them together 
into a security policy that it then applies. Firewalls can be personal (for a single user) 
or can be an enterprise’s firewall (for an organization’s network). Palo Alto 
Networks, Juniper Networks and the Cisco ASA firewall are examples of 
commercial firewalls. 
IPS is a combination of both IDS and firewall functionalities. IPSs have most 
of the detection and log techniques offered by IDSs. Moreover, an IPS can prevent 
what it detects. An example of an IPS is the Cisco IPS 4200 series.  
Honeypots are vulnerable systems. These offer a lot of vulnerability to the 
attackers in order to trap them and trace their activities, such as security control 
bypasses, privilege escalations, and so on. The data generated is then used to 
improve the current security system.  
An IDS is a detection technique used to monitor, alert and log suspicious 
traffic. Host-based IDSs (HIDSs) and network-based IDSs (NIDSs) are different 
types of IDSs. 
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A signature-based method and an anomaly-based method are the different 
methods for detection. Both detection methods allow the system administrator to 
create his own rules and execute them with specific users, throughout the subnet or 
throughout the whole organization’s network.  
2.2.1 HIDS 
 An HIDS is used to monitor the user’s PC for misconfigurations, 
policy enforcement, rootkit detection, integrity, event correlation and log analysis. It 
is useful to monitor those audit trails that determine an insider or a policy violation, 
as well as to trace the improper activities of a specific user ID. Due to its position, it 
can identify malicious activities over encrypted networks or switched network 
topology. Some useful HIDS services are: 
File integrity checking (berkeley, n.d.): Generate periodically cryptographic 
checksum value to maintain the integrity of files. 
File attributes checking: Check file permission and ownership modifications. 
File access attempts: Monitor file access for both users and applications, and 
the type of requested access (e.g. read, write or execute). 
Code analysis: Monitor and check the attempt of execute code, such as buffer 
overflow attacks. This is useful to thwart privilege escalation, malware and 
unauthorized access (google, n.d.). 
Network configuration monitoring: Monitor the integrity of the network 
configuration of a host.  
The drawbacks of HIDSs are: 
Draw on the resources of a user’s host. 
Cannot detect a packet over the network (sans, 2005). 
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Tripwire is an example of an HIDS created by Dr. Eugene Spafford and Gene 
Kim in 1992 at Purdue University. 
 
2.2.2 NIDS 
An NIDS is used to monitor an organization’s network to prevent malicious 
traffic. It can use one of the common detection methods (signature-based detection or 
anomaly-based detection). 
Both detection methods have advantages and disadvantages. For example, 
signature-based detection cannot detect zero-day attacks, while an anomaly-based 
detection system can. However, an anomaly-based method generates more false 
positive alarms than a signature-based method.  
 
2.2.3 IDS Detection Approaches  
Signature-based detection:  
This approach first sniffs incoming or outgoing network traffic, and then 
compares these sniffed packets with a set of rules in order to identify a malicious 
packet. Additional configurations include spans or a mirror port in a network switch 
required to see all types of network traffic. An NIDS network’s position is very 
important – for example, placing an IDS as a first line of defense in order to monitor 
a firewall’s performance is a good idea. 
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Anomaly-based detection:  
Anomaly-based detection requires security administrators to identify 
unexpected behavior. Examples of unexpected behavior include an ICMP packet 
with a large payload size, or sending a large number of packets with an SYN flag to 
well-known ports to specific PCs.   
 
Signature-based detection: 
These systems detect malicious traffic based on a unique pattern – for 
example, a path traversal or directory traversal attack should contains dots and 
slashes (../../../../); therefore, the signature of the directory traversal attack is 
(../../../../). Another example is if an attacker sends an http login request with ‘admin’ 
as the username and the wrong password more than a specific number of times, then 
these admin login attempts will be logged and the IDS will send an alert. The 
‘admin’ keyword along with the wrong password is an example signature (admin 
login attempt). Signatures are stored in an IDS database and are compared with each 
network packet. 
2.3 Snort 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Snort is an open-source packet sniffer and IDS created by Martin Roesch in 
1998. It was created to sniff network packets such as tcpdump. Later, it was 
improved to detect malicious packets and identify attacks, which it can now do both 
over the network and offline (by reading the pcap files). 
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Snort is a signature-based analysis. Each Snort rule has content that 
represents a unique pattern present in a malicious packet. Some packets can match 
with more than one attack signature – for example, the first alert may be generated if 
an attacker requests the website’s admin page, and the second alert could be 
generated due to a failed admin login attempt.  
2.3.2 Configuration 
Various rules, such as web-attacks, SQL injection, scan attempts, virus, bad-
traffic, ftp attacks and other rules, are written by the Snort community. Snort’s 
configuration file activates and maps these rules with certain important variables, 
such as the following. 
HOME_NET: This is a network you need to protect from outside attacks. It 
accepts IP network addresses or can also accept ‘any’ as a string to detect all 
malicious packets.  
External_NET: This is a network that is outside the scope of the home 
network (e.g. the Internet, a third-party network). It also accepts ‘any’ as an input to 
detect everything. The (#) hash symbol to comment the rule. The configuration file 
allows users to modify and enter all the details of their internal and external servers, 
as well as configure major detection components, such as a decoder, a preprocessor 
and an output plugin. 
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2.3.3 Snort Architecture  
Packet decoder:	  
A series of decoders is used to decode or reconstruct a network packet to 
prepare it for the rest of the IDS’s components. Each decoder responds to a specific 
network layer. For example, when a decoder receives a packet, it checks what 
physical interface the packet contains and sends the packet to a specific decoder that 
responds to that interface, after which it checks what transport protocol packet is 
used and then sends it to the right decoder. Various decoders are used for different 
interfaces (Caswell, 2007). 
 
Layer protocols and decoders:  
Interfaces such as the Ethernet have their own decoders. An 802.11 has its 
own decoder, and network layer protocols (such as IP, ARP and IPX) have their own 
decoders. An ICMP decoder, TCP decoder and UDP decoder are responsible for 
decoding a packet’s transport layer. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between a 
decoder and the network layers.
 
Figure 1: Layers and decoders 
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Decoders have their own rules during the packet decoding process. A decoder 
rule is generated when an error occurs; for example, if there is invalid IP header 
length with a received packet, then the decoder will log that error and create an alert. 
	  
Figure 2: Snort rule  
	  
The decoder decodes a packet by reconstructing its original structure into a 
specific structure. It set pointers for the most crucial aspects in terms of detection, 
and allows components such as the preprocessor and the detection engine to gain a 
clear picture of their targets inside the packet (Caswell, 2007). In short, it prepares 
the scene of investigation for the preprocessor and detection engine.  
 
Preprocessor:	  	  
This	  normalizes the network packets for the detection engine. For example, if 
the preprocessor receives a fragmented packet, it will wait until it receives the full 
packet before sending it on to the detection engine. Preprocessors are very important 
for successfully completing the detection process, as they prepare a packet payload 
for the detection engine. Certain special preprocessors are used to analyze an 
incoming packet to help identify those attacks that have no signature. For instance, 
there is no content that describes a port sweep attempt; however, new preprocessors 
use a technique called target-based detection that reassembles the packet and 
segments as a target. Preprocessors also prevent issues in terms of fragmented 
packets. If an attacker has sent a malicious packet to a Windows operating system, 
Windows will arrange those packets in a specific order that is different from a Linux 
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operating system. This means that an IDS should order the fragmented packets 
according to a Windows operating system and not a Linux operating system. 
 
Rules:  
In a detection process, each rule is split into two sections: the first section is 
called a rule tree node (RTN) or rule header, and the second is called an option tree 
node (OTN) or rule option.  
RTN data contains a required action, which is an action that is generated if a 
packet matches that rule. Examples of action values are activate, dynamic, alert, pass 
and log, and examples of protocol values are TCP, UDP, IP or ICMP. The home 
network IP address, port number, and the direction symbol are used to first identify 
the source and destination (<>), and then the external network and its port number.  
OTN data contains a message that will be displayed in the Snort log (MSG), a Snort 
rule identifier (SID), an attack signature (Content), rule classification (Class type) 
and so on (snort, n.d.).  
 
Detection Engine: 	  	  
This compares network packets with each possible rule. The comparison 
process has initial requirements. For example, Snort should divide each rule to two 
tree nodes (rule header and rule option), after which it will split the incoming packet 
into another two sections (packet header and packet payload). The packet header will 
be compared with the rule header until a match found, and then the packet payload 
will be compared with all possible rule options for the selected rule header. Snort 
will generate the required action mentioned in the rule header only once a packet 
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header has been matched with a rule header and a packet payload matched with a 
rule option.  
The detection engine is the core of the comparison process. It receives 
packets from the preprocessor and checks if there is any malicious content in a 
packet payload by comparing it with attack signatures (content). The detection 
engine receives packets, checks the protocols contained – these can be TCP, UDP, IP 
or ICMP – and then selects the root node based on those four protocols. So if the 
received packet contains an IP protocol and an TCP protocol, then Snort will check 
both protocols and the packet will check both RTNs. 
 
Figure 3: Snort constructs detection rules  
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Figure 4: Snort RTNs and OTNs  
 
Output Models:	  
 Several output plugins and formats are used to present Snort results. CSV, 
XML and PCAP are examples of output formats.  
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Figure 5: Snort architecture 
Snort Content: 
Snort is a signature-based IDS that relies on a large set of signatures. SID is a 
unique snort ID for IDS signatures, and each rule can have fragmented pieces of 
single signature. Not all rules have content. Some rules can generate an alert if there 
is a specific IP address in the packet header. Alternately, if the packet header has 
encryption data and a specific port (such as an SSH) is used, there is nothing in the 
payload to analyze and no content in the payload will match the rule options.  
However, the rule option may have one or more pieces of content, such as the 
following example.  
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Moreover, content values may be in the ASCII format, HEX format or both 
ASCII and HEX formats. 
Table 1: ASCII content 
CONTENT Rule SID 
MIT-MAGIC-COOKIE-1 1225 
/sensepost.exe 989 
/fp4areg.dll 1247 
GET   /../../../../../../../../../../../ 1049 
fp30reg.dll 1246 
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Table 2: : Hex content 
CONTENT Rule SID 
B4 B4 163 
28 00 01 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 2124 
C2 C5 CD C4 FD F9 FF 86 E4 9A F8 FF 
E5 9B 98 E5 FC E1 FD A9 FC 
6024 
	  
	  
Table 3: Content with both ASCII and HEX formats 
CONTENT Rule SID 
Insane Network vs 4.0 by Suid 
Flow|0A 0D|www.blackcode.com|0A 
0D|[r00t]|23| 
3015 
Content-Type|3A| application/x-
icq 
1832 
Proxy-Authorization|3A| NTLM 12362 
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A Snort rule can identify the position of content in the payload using depth 
keywords. For example: 
 
Figure 6: Example of depth keyword 
 
Snort Pattern Matcher: 
The Snort pattern matcher groups OTNs with a single RTN. A single RTN 
usually has many OTNs, and a single packet header can send more than one 
malicious payload. The pattern matcher is used to reduce the number of rules that 
must be handled, as the number of rules always increases when processing a large 
number of packets. Snort users can develop their own rule and save it in a local.rules 
file with a higher SID number to avoid any collision with other SIDs (Snort cannot 
run with two rules that contain the same SID, as the rule parser gets the rule file from 
snort.conf and checks the validation of all rules at Snort initialization). 
The Parser.c file has many functions that are used for Snort initialization. For 
example, function ParseRulesFile() is used to prepare all rules from the config file to 
function ParseRule (). ParseRule () verifies the rules and checks if there are 
additional instructions that relate to the preprocessor and output plugins; if there are, 
it provides the required function for each of them (Andrés Felipe Arboleda, 2005). 
Rule categories are based on protocol type, for example a ListHead structure is used 
to organize the rules with their action (ferryas.lecturer.pens.ac.id, n.d.). 
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Figure 7: Both sides show the list of protocol types, output types and action 
types 
 
Two different structures are used for both RTNs and OTNs, and 
ProcessHeadNode() is used to call and prepare OTNs for each RTN. An RTN 
structures header details, while an OTN stores rule options.   
 
Fast Pattern Matching Algorithm: 
Snort uses many string matching algorithms to ensure that the packet 
contains content (such as the Boyer–Moore (Fisk, 2002) and the Aho–Corasick (Fisk, 
2002) algorithms). The Aho–Corasick algorithm is based on a finite state machine: 
the algorithm should have a set of keywords that can be compared with a given text, 
and it can search multiple patterns simultaneously. The Boyer–Moore algorithm, 
however, uses two methods to match or find the pattern in a text. The first method is 
to construct a bad match table to match a given pattern with the text.  
2.4 Data Mining 
Data mining and predictive analysis has improved the performance of many 
systems. Applications use data mining techniques to improve their performance, as 
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security systems (whether a prevention system, such as a firewall, or a detection 
system, such as an IDS) require high performance to monitor network packets. Both 
prevention and detection systems should not allow network packets to bypass the 
required detection due to performance issues. Banking systems use data mining for 
consumer credit cards to improve their offers (i.e. they predict consumer purchase 
patterns based on specific purchases) and to predict future financial risk. 
WebWatcher is a data mining application used to create adaptive websites that 
automatically improve their presentation based on the user’s access pattern. 
Data mining comprises different techniques. However, due to the study’s 
scope, this thesis scope will focus on the predictive model of a decision tree and on 
classification techniques. 
	  
Figure 8: Data mining tree 
	  	  
Classifiers are used to classify the input and give it an appropriate class. 
Training data should be made available to classifiers for them to learn from it. For 
example, the training data may include malicious packets and their corresponding 
rules, which allows the classifier to learn how to act with such future inputs. 
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2.4.1 Naïve Bayes Classifier  
A naïve Bayes classifier is based on Bayes’ theorem, which is easy to 
understand. Bayes’ theorem uses prior probabilities and the likelihood of 
classification based on adjacent patterns. There are two prior probabilities in Bayes’ 
theorem: the first prior probability is for class, while the second is for object (dell, 
n.d.). 
	  
Figure 9: A naïve Bayes classifier. The left side describes class prior 
probability and right side is the likelihood of a new object based on its position  
	  
Figure 9 shows two classes, green and red. The green class is more than 
double the red class; thus, we assume that the probability of a new object belonging 
to the green class is greater than the probability of it belonging to the red class. This 
assumption is called prior probability. Prior probability is an assumption based on 
prior observation and is a part of Bayes’ theorem. The second part of Bayes’ theorem 
is the likelihood of an object belonging to a class. For example, in Figure 9, the red 
objects appear in the left side of the shape’s space, while the green objects occupy 
the right side. Therefore, we can assume that a new object on the left side is more 
likely to classify as red than to classify as green, and vice versa. 
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Figure 10: Posterior probability 
2.4.2 Decision Tree 
A decision tree is a learning method used in machine learning, and decides 
the output by constructing a tree of given inputs. Various algorithms are available to 
build decision trees, such as Iterative Dichotomiser 3 (ID3) and C4.5. A decision tree 
builds tree nodes of the given inputs, and arranges instances from root nodes to leaf 
nodes. 
	  
Figure 11: Decision tree 
	  
In a decision tree, the ‘leaves’ are always decisions. Figure 11 discusses the 
possibility of playing golf with different weather situations. There are many 
situations with two decisions (classes) yes or no. For example, the player can play 
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golf if the outlook is sunny and the humidity is normal, or if we use if-then rules with 
an overcast outlook, the result will be:  
If ‘outlook = overcast’ then ‘play’. 
ID3: 
ID3 is a learning method that uses both entropy and information gain within a 
data set to split the original set and generate a node tree. ID3 selects the root of the 
given data set based on information gain score, with the highest score acting as the 
root of the decision tree. The method keeps splitting the tree nodes until a leaf node 
is found.  
 
C4.5:  
C4.5 has more features than ID3, and both classification algorithms construct 
the tree nodes differently. ID3’s limitation is its overfitting problem; C4.5 solves this 
overfitting problem through the pruning technique. 
 
2.4.3 N-gram analysis 
N-gram is an important part of language modeling. N-gram uses the 
probability of the prior values to predict the new value; for example, it can predict 
the availability of a word in a sentence based on the prior probability of that 
sentence.  
Unigram: 
A unigram is an estimated likelihood of a word (or character) occurring in a 
given text (or word) based on the frequency of occurrence. 
UNIGRAM = U, N, I, G, R, A, M 
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Bigram:  
A bigram is an estimated likelihood of two contiguous words occurring in a 
given text based on the frequency of occurrence. 
BIGRAM ≈ BI, IG, GR, RA, AM 
Trigram:  
A trigram is the estimated likelihood of three contiguous words occurring in a 
given text based on the frequency of occurrence. 
TRIGRAM ≈ TRI, RIG, IGR, GRA, RAM 
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Chapter 3: Proposed Technique 
 
The proposed Snort (based on data mining) will be referred to as the 
‘Intelligent Predictive Packet-Inspect Snort’ (IP2S). The high-level overview of the 
IP2S is illustrated in Figure 12. There are two main components of the Snort, namely 
the offline and the online components. The offline component collects network 
packets and uses them to train a classifier. The online component does the actual 
packet filtering online. Here, the classifier trained with the offline component is used 
to classify each incoming packet. The predicted class corresponds to a rule, which 
belongs to a set of filtering rules. If the classifier predicts the correct rule, i.e. the 
predicted rule matches the packet, then the corresponding rule action is taken. 
Otherwise, the prediction is wrong and, in that case, the traditional Snort is used to 
find the matching rule for the packet and the corresponding rule action is taken. By 
‘rule action’, we mean the action (e.g. alert) corresponding to the rule.  
	  
Figure 12: Proposed technique for the IP2S 
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Before going into the details, we will introduce several terms that will be 
frequently used in this chapter. 
Definition 1 – Packet (Ej): A network packet Ej is a data structure 
consisting of two parts: the header and the payload, denoted by H(Ej) and L(Ej) 
respectively.  
The header contains attributes such as protocol, source IP, destination IP, 
source port, destination port, and so on. The payload contains binary data (i.e. the 
content of the packet).  
Definition 2 – Feature set (F): The feature set is a set of attributes or 
features that is used for training and classification. The feature set consists of two 
subsets: the header feature set (H(F)) and the payload feature set (L(F)). The former 
is extracted from packet headers and the latter is extracted from packet payloads. 
Definition 3 – Feature vector (V(Ej)): The feature vector V(Ej) is a vector 
of feature values for the packet Ej, corresponding to the feature set F.  
Definition 4 – Rule (Ri): A rule Ri consists of three parts. The first two parts 
consist of the rule header and rule options, denoted by H(Ri) and O(Ri) respectively. 
The rule option section may contain zero or more options. The third part of rule Ri is 
the rule action, denoted by A(Ri). If a packet header matches the H(Ri) and the 
content (i.e. payload) matches the O(Ri), then the action A(Ri) is taken. Therefore, 
formally, a rule can be represented as H(Ri) V O(Ri)) A(Ri). The rule header of a 
rule consists of a number of field tests (e.g. Source IP = 10.*.*. * AND Protocol = 
TCP AND Destination Port = 80 AND ...). The rule option usually contains a 
signature (string or pattern) that must be present in packets, and the rule action in 
Snort is usually an alert.  
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Definition 5 – Rule match (M(Ej, Ri)): A packet Ej matches a rule Ri if the 
field values of the packet header H(Ej) satisfy all the field tests in the rule header 
H(Ri), and if the packet payload L(Ej) matches all the rule options O(Ri). We will 
denote this case (i.e. when Ej matches with Ri) with the symbol M(Ej, Ri). Likewise, 
¬M(Ej, Ri) will be used to denote cases where Ej does not match with Ri.  
Definition 6 – Rule set (R): The rule set R = {R1, R2, ….., RN} is the set of 
N rules in the Snort, where each Ri is a rule in the set.  
Definition 7 – Standard Snort (SSn): The SSn is an IDS that, for each 
incoming packet Ej, sequentially searches through the rule set R, starting from the 
first rule R1. If Ej does not match Ri (i.e. ¬M (Ej, Ri)), then the search continues 
with the next rule Ri+1. Otherwise, if M (Ej, Ri), the action A(Ri) is taken. 
3.1 Feature Extraction and Selection 
 We extract two types of features from packets: features from the packet 
header and features from the packet content (i.e. payload). 
1) Packet payload features: Packet payloads contain binary data. We use 
the N-gram feature extraction technique to extract features from the payload. An N-
gram is a sequence of N consecutive bytes in the payload. For example, if you 
assume that 0304051B1D1EF2F3F4FEFF is the payload (hex values), then the one-
gram (one-byte) sequences will be 03, 04, 05, and so on. The two-gram (two-byte) 
sequences will be 0304, 0405, 051B, and so on. Likewise, the three-gram (3-byte) 
sequences will be 030405, 04051B, 051B1D and so on. Note that there are 256 (= 
28) unique one-grams possible, and there are 65,536 (= 216) possible values of two-
grams and so on. Therefore, there are 28N possible different N-grams, which is a 
very large number for large values of N.  
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a)  Generating a one-gram feature vector: For one-gram, the total 
number of features is 256 (00, 01, 02, FF), which is a manageable number. We 
can generate a feature vector for one-gram as follows. For each packet, the 
feature vector consists of 256 binary values (i.e. 0 or 1). The i-th value in the 
vector has value = 1 if the packet contains the corresponding feature. For 
example, given the payload F2 04 F4 05 FE 1B 05 1E 03 FF F3, the feature 
vector would look like 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 .... 1 (256 values). The first value is 0 
because the corresponding one-gram (i.e. 00) is not present in the payload. The 
second value is also 0 for the same reason. Then we have 1 1 1 because the next 
three one-gram features (03, 04 and 05 respectively) are present in the payload. 
The last value (i.e. the 256th value) is 1 because the corresponding one-gram, 
FF, is also present in the payload. 
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Figure 13: Packet identification that exists in both payload and the corresponding Snort 
alert 
	  
	  
	  
Figure 14: One-gram feature vectors. The first value refers to packet ID and the last 
value is a class 
	  
b) Generating N-gram feature vectors (N >= 2): As mentioned before, the 
total number of two-grams is 65,536 and it grows exponentially with the value of N. 
Feature vectors with such a large number of features will not only take up large 
amounts of memory but will also have high processing time during training. 
However, the feature vectors will be very sparse. Therefore, we have devised a 
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heuristic approach for generating the two-grams or higher features, as explained 
below. 
Note that packet payload is inspected by Snort only if the corresponding rule 
contains an option with content, i.e. signature. Therefore, instead of considering all 
possible N-grams as features, we collect the signatures from all rules and generate N-
grams from those signatures only. This drastically reduces the total number of N-
grams generated. For example, if there are 100 rules and each rule contains a 10-byte 
signature on average, the maximum number of N-grams would be (at most) 1,000, 
whatever the value of N. However, we go one step ahead by further reducing the 
number of N-grams generated by selecting the best K based on information gain. 
 
	  
Figure 15: An example of two-gram feature vectors 
	  
3) Putting it together: In summary, the feature extraction and selection 
process works as follows. 
Construct a feature set for the packet headers (denoted as (H(F))), which 
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includes features such as IPSRC, IPDEST, PORTSRC, etc. 
Construct a feature set for N-gram features, N >= 1. Apply feature selection 
to reduce the number of these features. The selected set of features would be denoted 
as L(F).  
The final feature set would look like this: IPSRC, IPDSET, PORTSRC, ......, 
1-gram1, 1 gram2, ... ,2-gram1, 2-gram2, 
The feature vector V(Ej) (for the above feature set) corresponding to a packet 
Ej would look like this: 10.100.10.11, 10.11.100.101, 25, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0, 1, ... denoting 
that the packet’s source IP is 10.100.10.11, destination IP is 10.11.100.101, source 
port is 25, ...., 1-gram1 is present, 1-gram2 is absent and so on. 
3.2 Training the IP2S 
The training data D = {d1……., dM} consists of a set of M training instances 
dk, k∈ {1,…….,M}, where dk is the tuple (V(Ej), i), such that M(Ej, Ri). In other 
words, each training instance consists of the feature vector V(Ej) for the packet Ej 
and the class label i of the packet. The class label i of a packet is the index of the first 
rule (Ri) in the rule set that matches the packet. For example, let us assume the 
packet Ej matches the 10th rule (i.e. R10) in the rule set. In this case, the class label 
of Ej is 10. The class label of a packet can be found by running the SSn for the 
packet. Once we have training data, we can use this data to train a classifier C of our 
choice. This study has tried many different classifiers, but the best ones in terms of 
classification time and accuracy of prediction are the ‘decision tree’ and the ‘ripper’ 
classifiers. Note that the whole process of collecting the training data and training the 
classifier is done offline. 
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3.3 Filtering with the IP2S  
A packet Ej is provided to the classifier C as input. Note that we only provide 
the packet, not the class label. The class label of a packet is the index of the rule that 
matches the packet. The task of the classifier is to predict the class label of Ej. Let 
P(Ej) be the prediction (output or predicted class label) of the classifier for the packet 
Ej. Let P(Ej) = i, i.e. the classifier predicts i as the class label. Since the classifier 
prediction can be wrong, we must check the validity of this prediction. Therefore, we 
now have to test if M(Ej, Ri). If yes, then the prediction P(Ej) is correct and the 
corresponding action A(Ri) is taken. Otherwise, if the prediction P(Ej) is wrong (i.e. 
if ¬ M(Ej, Ri)), then the packet must go through the SSn to fetch the matching rule 
and, accordingly, the corresponding action. 
3.4 Performance Improvement 
In this chapter, we analytically proved how the performance of the IP2S is 
much improved from the SSn using the predictive filtering technique. The 
improvement mainly depends on the quality of the prediction, which can be 
improved by providing enough training data for the classifier to learn. 
Let TS(Ej) be the time needed to filter the packet Ej with the SSn, and TD(Ej) 
be the time needed to filter Ej with the IP2S. In addition, let IL(Ej) be the indicator 
function such that: 
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Let TC(Ej) be the time needed by the classifier to predict the class label of Ej 
(i.e. the classification time). Therefore, we can write: 
 
 
In other words, equation 2 states that the time taken to filter a packet by the 
IP2S is equal to the classification time if the prediction is correct, and the 
classification time plus SSn filtering time if the prediction is wrong. Therefore, the 
time needed to filter a batch of B packets 𝜉 = {E1…., EB} is given by: 
 
 
 
Here, p is the percentage of packets correctly classified (i.e. predicted 
correct) by the classifier. In other words, p would be the accuracy of prediction for 
the set of packets E.  
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Using equations 3 and 4, we can infer that there would be a gain in filtering 
time if: 
 
 
 
Therefore, there would be a gain in running time if the prediction accuracy of 
the classifier is greater than the ratio of the total classification time (TC) to the total 
SSn matching time. For many classification techniques, TC would be much less than 
TS. For example, for the decision tree classifier, the classification time is less than 
half the filtering time of SSn (which is empirically justified by our experiments). 
Therefore, in this case, there would be a gain even if the prediction accuracy is 50% 
(i.e. half of the packets are incorrectly classified). In real-world scenarios, the 
accuracy of a classifier is much higher than 50%, provided that it is trained with 
enough training data. We also derive an interesting relationship between 
classification accuracy and the running time of the IP2S from equation 5. It can be 
seen that the filtering time of the IP2S decreases with the classifier’s increasing 
accuracy. This has been confirmed with the empirical evaluations undertaken with 
the IP2S (in chapter 5). 
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Chapter 4: Experiments and Results 
 
In this chapter, we describe the data sets and experimental environment, and 
discuss and analyze the results.  
4.1 Data Sets and Experimental Setup 
We have used real network traffic from the CAIDA anonymized Internet 
traces 2013 data set (caida dataset, n.d.) Furthermore, we generated synthetic ‘attack’ 
data using the Metasploit framework. 
 
Figure 16: Process of collecting malicious payloads using the Metasploit framework 
	  
Competing approaches: In the IP2S, the classifier used is a decision tree. The 
SSn is used as a baseline. 
Parameter settings: We filter exactly the same set of packets for both the IP2S 
and SSn; this set consists of 10 million packets. For training the classifier, we use 
10,000 packets but these training packets are not used in the test set (i.e. for 
filtering). Moreover, exactly the same set of Snort rules (consisting of 500 rules) is 
used to test both IDSs. These rules have been generated by hand, and follow standard 
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security policies observed in our institution.  
Hardware and software: The experiments were done on a standalone 
workstation that had an Intel Core i5 2.4GHz processor with 8GB RAM and a 
750GB hard drive. The operating system was Windows 7. For the SSn, we used 
Snort version 2.9.8.0, and a major part of the IP2S was developed in Java (NetBeans 
IDE). We have heavily relied on the Weka machine learning API (waikato 
University, n.d.) for feature extraction and selection and classification. 
4.2 Results and Discussion 
We evaluate the system based on the total processing time. Figure 17 shows 
the processing time comparison between the SSn and the IP2S. The x-axis of this 
graph corresponds to the number of packets processed (in millions) and the y-axis 
corresponds to the total processing time in milliseconds. For example, at x=10 
million, the y values of SSn and SSF are 822001 and 113181 respectively, meaning 
that the SSn takes 822,001 milliseconds to filter 10 million packets, whereas IP2S 
takes only 113,181 milliseconds. Thus, IP2S takes about one seventh of the time 
taken by the SSn. In other words, the throughput of IP2S is more than seven times 
that of the SSn. 
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Figure 17: Number of packets vs. cumulative processing time 
Figure 17 also shows the classification time (cumulative) taken by the 
classifier of the IP2S; this is shown with the IP2S (clasfn) curve. It is evident from the 
chart that the the total filtering time required by the IP2S is only a little more than the 
classification time, which means that most of the class predictions have been correct. 
In fact, in this case, the class prediction accuracy was 90% or more. However, based 
on equation 5 in chapter 4, we can infer that even if the prediction accuracy were as 
low as 50%, the total running time of the IP2S would be less than that of the SSn. 
This is because, here, the IP2S’s classification time is about one third of the filtering 
time of the SSn (822 seconds for the filtering time of the SSn and 113 seconds for the 
classification by the IP2S). 
Figure 18 shows how the processing time varies with the number of rules in 
the IDS. We have run both the IDSs with 50, 100, 200 and 500 rules. As expected, 
with the increasing number of filtering rules, processing times also increase. But the 
rate of this increment is higher for the SSn than it is for the IP2S. This is because, 
with the increase in the number of rules, the time to find a matching rule also 
increases in the SSn (it has to browse through a longer list). However, for the IP2S, 
the searching time does not increase as much due to the (mostly) correct predictions 
39	  
	  
	  
	  
	  
made by the classifier. The slight increase that the IP2S observes is due to the extra 
time needed to classify an instance (as the tree is now more complex) and the extra 
time needed when the classifier makes a wrong prediction.  
 
	  
Figure 18: Number of rules vs cumulative processing time 
Effect of the number of training data on the processing time and accuracy of 
the IP2S: The size of the training data has a direct impact on the accuracy of the 
classifier. Generally, the prediction accuracy of a good classifier should increase with 
an increasing size of training data. This is observed in our experiments, as shown in 
Figure 19(a). Here, the x-axis represents the number of training data (in hundreds) 
and the y-axis represents the prediction accuracy of the classifier on the test data. 
There are two curves: one representing 100 rules and the other 500 rules. The curve 
for 100 rules shows the accuracy of the classifier when we have 100 rules in the IDS, 
and the classifier is trained and tested accordingly. The same description goes for the 
curve representing 500 rules. Both of these curves observe the expected behavior, i.e. 
an increase in prediction accuracy with an increase in training data. Recall that, from 
our theoretical analysis on the impact of classifier accuracy on filtering time (chapter 
4), we concluded that the filtering time of the IP2S decreases with increasing 
accuracy.  
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Figure 19(a) size of training data vs classifier accuracy and (b) accuracy vs processing 
time for the IP2S 
 
The empirical observations confirm this theory, as reported in Figure 19(b). 
Figure 19(b) shows how the processing time varies with the prediction accuracy of 
the classifier. In both these figures, we report the performance of the IP2S for 100 
rules and for 500 rules. In general, the processing time reduces as the prediction 
accuracy increases. This is because with higher prediction accuracy, the correct rule 
is predicted more often, requiring less browsing through the rule list to find the 
matching rule. We get another interesting observation from these figures.  
We observe that, for a larger number of rules, the processing time of the IP2S 
is higher. For example, when accuracy is 92%, the processing times of the IP2S with 
100 rules and 500 rules are 414 milliseconds and 101 milliseconds respectively. 
Therefore, the larger the number of rules, the higher the running time even for the 
same rate of accuracy. This happens because, for example, when the accuracy is 
92%, only 8% of packets are incorrectly classified, meaning that the IP2S has to 
browse through the list of rules to find a match for these 8% of packets. However, 
this browsing takes longer and incurs more hits when the list is larger (i.e. 100 vs 500 
rules). 
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We tested four different classifiers with our two-gram feature data, and found 
that each classifier has different results. In addition, we tested one-gram feature data 
with these different classifiers, and the results of the classifiers were less accurate 
than for two-gram feature data.  
 
Figure 20: Results of the J48 classifier, naïve Bayes classifier, random forests and 
SMO function with two-grams  
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Figure 21: Two gram’s classifier accuracy with different volumes of packets  
	  
Figure 22: One gram’s classifier accuracy with different volumes of packets  
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Chapter 5: Conclusion 
	  
We have introduced a novel and intelligent approach for faster packet 
matching by IDSs. In this approach, a classifier is first trained to predict the 
matching rule for any given packet and is then employed in the real network. This 
results in faster speed in terms of packet matching compared to a standard IDS 
(which browses through the set of rules to find the matching rule for a packet). We 
have proved the effectiveness of our approach both theoretically and empirically with 
real network traffic. We have also analyzed the different parameters of the system, 
such as the number of rules and the size of training data. 
In the future, we would like to enhance intelligent predictive matching by 
introducing more efficient and sophisticated classifiers to address the issue of lower 
accuracy in the presence of a large number of rules. Besides this, we hope to apply 
different classifiers, big network data, and different attack scenarios to evaluate the 
robustness of our approach. 
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Two-gram features vectors  
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Two-gram source code  
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One-gram source code  
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